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The aim of this paper i to demon trate how form of ethical
questioning can be applied to the field of literary studies. TIle que tion
as to whether it is legitimate to develop a literary theory which is
properly ethical, that is, one that is founded on ethical rather than
historical, epistemological or linguistic considerations, remains
problematical at this stage, and it would certainly be premature to
claim an independent status for a comprehensive 'ethical' model of
literature. Rather I intend to proceed obliquely by exploring the
question of ethics with respect to the works of three well-known
literary theorists, namely J. Hillis Miller, Jean-Paul Sartre and Hans-
Robert Jauss, all of whom command a strong position within the field
of literary studies.! Although these names are associated with
contrasting and even opposing theories of literature, with differing
views on the relative status of the writer, the reader and the literary
work, I maintain that it is pos ible to establish a common ground
between them to the extent that each, in hi own way, poses the
problem of ethics.
Of the three, Hillis Miller's model is the most directly and indeed
radically ethical, as he tries to guide the Deconstructive method of
which he is a founder away from the realm of gratuitous play and
towards the more edifying notion of social responsibility. I will try to
show in detail how he goes about the ta k of what one may term the
moral correction of Decon truction. The second theory I will discu s
is that of Jean-Paul Sartre, who extends the concept of engagement
drawn from his Existentialist philo ophy to the activity of writing
and reading texts. Thus, for Sartre, literary activity becomes significant
only when writers and readers make an unconditional commitment to
projects of social change. Finally, Hans-Robert Jauss's hermeneutic
approach to literature will be examined in order to gauge its underlying
ethical concerns. My comments will deal principally with the third
and culminating stage of hermeneutic thinking, that of application,
where one confronts the question of the practical implications of
literary understanding.
To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish the two key ideas
which will direct my discussion. The first i that the ethical import
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of literary criticism is to be situated within the confines of reading,
reading being the process whereby literary texts come to have a real
influence on contemporary affairs, either by bringing about a change
in the attitudes of individuals, or by creating new modes of behaving
or thinking across sections of the population. So it is that I shall refer
henceforth to the ethics of reading. The second point is that reading is
not a purely cognitive or speculative activity concerned with the
building up of theoretical knowledge, but is to be conceived as an
instance of practical reason-or praxis-in which thought is
necessarily directed towards action. In other words, reading as a
process of meaning construction is inherently ends-driven or purposive.
Drawing these two points together, I shall argue that the first step in
the direction of an ethical approach to literary criticism, is to effect a
shift in focus so that one's interest lies no longer in sources or
determining causes-which include authorial practices-nor in the
forms or structures which characterize literature as a genre, but in the
question of the ends of literature as they are realized in the process of
reading. I shall now discuss Hillis Miller's Deconstruction, Sartre's
Existentialism and Jauss's Hermeneutics in light of the conceptual
framework just outlined.
Hillis Miller
Turning to Hillis Miller's essay The Ethics of Reading, consider the
very loaded statement with which he opens his discussion. 'I shall
argue', he writes, 'that there is a peculiar and unexpected relation
betwccn the affirmation of universal moral law and storytelling'.2
The two sides of the equation are clearly established: on the one hand
we find the forms of narrative composition, with its own generic
processes and structures, and on the other hand the notion of the
moral law which establishes a set of principles seen to be valid
universally, and thus carrying the force of an obligation. Having
distinguished the two domains, Hillis Miller brings them together by
stating that narrative functions by placing the reader before an
obligation, an 'I must' which is to be conceived less in terms of a
constraint or a prohibition, than in terms of a willing adherence to a
law which binds the reader in a sort of a contract passed with the text.
More specifically, the contract enjoins the reader to submit to the
linguistic and rhetorical injunctions of the text, and in return the latter
will introduce the reader into a universal historical narrative carrying
the promise of a satisfying end. This is because, says Hillis Miller,
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narrative 'has an implicit teleology. It creates history. It is the prolepsis
of a story not only with a beginning but with a middle and an end.
Like all founding legislation or drawing up of a social contract it
makes a promise'.3 Narrative then possesses a telos in the strong
sense of producing necessary outcomes. It is driven by ethical
imperatives which become the 'source of [the individual's] cognitive
and political acts' ,4 to the extent that they may be considered to be, in
a more general sense, 'productive and inaugural in [their] effects on
history'.5 Narrative possesses the force of a moral law, then, because
of the inner necessity in evidence in its formal organisation. It is this
formal necessity which, in calling for the reader's unconditional
acceptance, eventually produces its effects in the extra-literary realms
of politics and history.
It is certainly surprising to see Deconstruction calling for such a
heavily loaded moral philosophy, given that it has in the past refused
to acknowledge moral distinctions of any kind. It is not difficult,
however, to understand the motives behind this move. Reading the
introduction to Hillis Miller's book, one senses that he is troubled by
criticisms made of the deconstructive method, which has become the
object of such unsavoury epithets as 'elitist', 'arbitrary', 'obscure'.
'irrelevant' and 'nihilist'. The ethics of reading seems designed to
curtail such attacks, for through it one is in a position to investigate,
to quote Hillis Miller, 'the relations of literature to history. to moral
choice, and to public decision making'.6 He extends his ethical
reformulation of Deconstruction to the situation of the humanities in
general, saying that '[it] is these new forms of rhetoric and poetics
that will lead the way toward that taking of responsibility for language,
for literature, and for the role of these in society and history which is
called for today'.7 It appears that Deconstruction is taking, through
Hillis Miller's efforts, what Americans like to call the moral high
ground, hoping to silence its critics by taking a stronger position than
they would perhaps ever take themselves.
This may well leave literary scholars perplexed. Given the now
well-known deconstructionist formula which states that readings of
texts are necessarily unstable, that meaning is constantly short-circuited
in the series of displacements created by figural language, that the
reader constantly loses footing in the shifting sands of the text. how
are we to fathom its unexpected ethical turn? The answer is that
Deconstruction's subversive power can no longer be thought of as
being anarchic with respect to the reader's involvement with the text.
Rather, it appears to be invested with a rule-giving function which
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determines not only the mode of reading which ensues, but also the
making of history itself.
How is this possible in deconstructionist terms? One has to
recognize that Hillis Miller's ethics of reading is an extension of the
performative model of literature he previously embraced. Literature
is performative when we consider it as an act of story-telling. This
places it on the same plane as other inter-subjective acts such as
making promises, expressing intentions or telling lies. But these
performative situations, that is the telling, the doing and promising,
have the peculiar characteristic of denying their efficacy as act,>, so
that we are left with the uncomfortable feeling that the promises
remain unkept, the intentions unrealized, the truths and the lies
unconvincing. It is at this point that Deconstruction takes its now
well-known stand: it says that literature is to be understood
fundamentally as performance subverting itself, so that in the
performative situation in which the reader is placed, all efforts to
derive meaning from the work are presented in both their necessity
and their impossihility. What results is a peculiar type of
performativity, in which antagonistic forces are maintained in a state
of suspensive free play, so that possible forms of activity are posited
without any attempt heing made to establish their real outcomes. It is
this purely formal conception of performativity which enables
Deconstruction to enter into its ethical phase.
In his Ethics of Reading, Hillis Miller makes the ingenious leap
from the domain of performativity to that of morality. Instead of the
text telling readers what to do, and then denying them the possibility
of doing it, it places itself on a higher level of abstraction where it
confronts the prohlem of the very possibility of issuing commands.
Instead of the text telling readers to perform certain acts, it now
considers whether it has the right tell the reader to do anything at all.
Hillis Miller's ethical move is, by his own admission, a Kantian one.
Now the text is conceived according to its legislative moment, whose
.claim to truth is such that it cannot but be obeyed, for the reader
cannot but firmly adhere to its principles. Following the Kantian
conception of the individual as a free rational agent, Hillis Miller
places the individual reader at the very centre of literature's ethical
function. It is the individual reader who provides the fundamental
drive for the attribution of meanings to texts, by virtue of the
approhation with which he greets the law emanating from them.
The ethics of reading is only concerned to examine the text's law-
giving potential as it impinges on individual acts of reading. Consider
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the following testimony by Hillis Miller: 'I still stand before the law
of the ethics of reading, subject to it, compelled by it, persuaded of its
existence and sovereignty by what happens to me when I read. What
happens is an "I must" that is always the same but always different,
unique, idiomatic. '8 Standing before the law, the only possible reaction
of the reader is to acquiesce to its commands, viewing these not as
specific acts to be accomplished, but as the mark of the necessity of
forming a project directed towards history. True to Deconstruction's
fundamental premise, Hillis Miller states that narrative remains the
essential vehicle of the moral law, which constantly appears in its
various linguistic and rhetorical guises. The law thus acquires each
time a presence which is 'different', 'unique' and 'idiomatic'. This is
because one never eradicates the fundamental 'epistemological error'
which continues to pervade texts through their various rhetorical
transcriptions, these being contained in such figures as prolepsis.
repetition and allegory, to .quote the three traditionally favoured by
Deconstruction. But here, the ethics of reading is concerned with the
final, motivating cause of the 'epistemological error', as it is realized
by the reader who docs not merely collaborate in its projected rhetorical
designs, but who brings it to fruition by virtue of it having attained
the force and the amplitude of a moral law.
When Hillis Miller writes that' ... each act of reading like ethical
acts in general, is a performative new start' ,9 one is struck by the
essentially teleological perspective in which he places himself. More
than this, it appears that the common ground between reading as an
act and ethics as a discipline, is precisely the recognition of a telos as
a founding principle. This telas is contained in the fact that reading,
as praxis, is a rule-governed activity eminently directed towards an
end. That Deconstruction continues to define this end as nothing
other than the production of more text, of more story commanding
the relentlessly fitful restarts of human destiny, does not undermine
its ethical basis. For although it is the text which commands the telos
of reading, it is the presence of the reader as a frce and conscious
agent, necessary to the fulfilment of that end, which makes reading
ethical.
Sartre
Jean-Paul Sartre develops an equally strong teleological view of
literature in his essay What is Literature? published in 1950. The end
of literature, he asserts, 'is to appeal to the freedom of men so that
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they may realize and maintain the reign of human freedom' .10 It is
true that Sartre stresses in these essays the responsibility of the writer
to become involved in the social issues of the day, through the act of
writing which is secn as an effective form of social and political
action. However, a substantial part of the book is devoted specifically
to the activity of reading, which is considered as important for human
freedom as the act of writing. I quote here from Sartre: 'Since creation
can find its fulfilment only in reading, since the artist must entrust to
another the task of carrying out what he has begun, since it is only
through the consciousness of the reader that he can regard himself as
essential to his work, all literary work is an appeal'.l1 The task of the
reader, then, is to answer the 'appeal' originating in the text. In this
formulation, Sartre, like Hillis Miller, is effectively dealing with the
problem of the ends of literature from the point of view of the
reader's relation to the text. This relation is conceived according to
the main tenets of existentialism as Sartre had defined them: that is,
the individual exists through his capacity to exercise 'pure freedom',
in undertaking 'unconditioned activity'I2 with a view to changing in
some way his social, political or cultural environment. Sartre's literary
criticism reflects this existential position, by positing a pure form of
freedom which results in intervention in social and political affairs by
the individual reader who assumes full responsibility for his actions.
The path that Sartre charts from the bounds of the text to the
world of action, via the activity of reading, is first and foremost an
ethical one because it is governed by the notion of ends. In reading a
work, Sartre asserts, 'I transform the [textual]given into an imperative,
and the [textual] fact into a value' .13 Borrowing from Kant's Ethical
Philosophy, he goes on to explain that the literary work 'from the
very begi nning pI aces itself on the level of the Categorical
Imperative' ,14 which is a specific instance of reason determining the
way in which the moral law makes itself known to free rational
agents. One cannot escape here the rationalist and idealist
underpinnings of Sartre's model, which brings rational truth to bear
on moral choice. Reading is thus an example of the workings of
Kant's Practical Reason, for through it one is called upon to devise
rules of social behaviour which have the force of duty, and to which
one chooses to adhere because they are formulated according to the
dictates of Reason.
But what part is played by the text in this forceful affirmation of
the ends of literature? And what specific literary methodology is
required for this end to be fully revealed? Two points need to be
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made in this connection. The first is Sartre's belief that the text must
be interpreted in light of the historical circumstances which surrounded
not only the writing of the work but also its initial reception by the
reading public. Thus, the possible repercussions of the work can only
be considered in terms of the concrete and finite conditions of the
reader's life experience, and of the situational constraints which weigh
upon him as he devises his project of social action. In his analysis of
Vercors' novel The Silence of the Sea, published during the Second
World War, Sartre makes the radical assertion that the effectiveness
of the work is limited to the period of the German occupation of
France, because it is only during this period that readers can devise
forms of action, envisage political projects, in keeping with the
message of the novel. I5 This is because, says Sartre, 'being situated
is an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom' .16 Sartre
defends here a peculiarly virulent type of historicist method, with the
historical boundaries drawn exclusively around the historical events
portrayed, inasmuch as they anticipate the forms of social and political
intervention in which a reading public could conceivably engage in
response to the work. Here, Sartre's idea of the work's telos is acutely,
and perhaps ahusively, historicist.
Dut we arc no closer here to an understanding of how the literary
text functions with respect to the imperative to engage in social
action. What are the characteristics of the literary text which convey
its appeal to the reader? We come to the second point which must be
made in connection with Sartre's theory, namely that his ethics of
reading is much more inclined towards aesthetical notions than
textual givens. In fact. textual considerations are ruled out rather
abruptly, in his curious statement that literary language should be
simple and direct, without any hint at all of stylistic or rhetorical
devices. To quote Sanre, '[s]ince words are transparent and since the
gaze looks through them, it would be absurd to slip in among them ...
panes of rough glass'.J7 Language then does not interest Sartre..
What does interest him arc the sequences of actions portrayed in
the work, and the choices made by the characters in dealing with
the ncar impossihle situations in which they find themselves. The
reader develops with respect to the fictional world what Sartre calls
a 'positional consciousness' ,18 which is a form of involvement in
the exemplary struggles played out in the work. Furthermore, it is
this 'positional' aspect of reading which provides the essential
structure of 'aesthetic pleasure', in other words the feeling of
exhilaration which, beyond the realm of disinterested contemplation,
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brings about the desire to act ethically.
These sometimes curious methodological choices can be explained
by the fact that Sartre is first and foremost a philosopher, and only
secondarily a literary critic. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to be
impressed by the strong teleological slant of his literary method.
Through his elucidation of the phenomenology of meaning production,
Sartre aims to highlight the way in which literature gives rise to a
socially responsible readership, via an ethical imperative which
orientates readers directly to the society they belong to. However, it
is this direct access to reality which poses a problem in Sartre' s
criticism. One can justly claim that literature is composed of mediate
forms of reality, and that reading must consequently determine itself
with respect to the instances and strategies of mediation proper to
texts. These questions may be usefully dealt with by turning now to
the field of literary hermeneutics.
Jauss
One could conceivably object that it is forcing the issue to draw
Jauss's hermeneutics into the sphere of ethics, for hermeneutics
as a discipline has traditionally been concerned to develop ways
of reconciling logical oppositions, of balancing points of view, of
recognizing the right to exist of the Other in its own terms and for its
own sake. Hermeneutics as the art of understanding does not as a rule
sit easily with the more aggressively voluntarist stance of the ethical
thinker. Neither does it readily admit of the ethical imperative which,
in seeking universal validity, tends to override the claims made by
the Other. I maintain, however, that it is useful to consider Jauss's
literary hermeneutics as pointing in the direction of an ethics of
reading, for it retains the strong teleological principles in evidence in
Hillis Miller's and Sartre's models, all the while attenuating the
latter's dogmatism and bringing to light methodological questions
which they have tended to overlook.
The starting point of hermeneutics is the recognition of the inherent
strangeness of the literary work, which can be attributed to the fact
that it almost always comes to us from a different age, and from a
different place. Hermeneutics is the process by which the reader
comes to terms with this strangeness, so that the message conveyed
by the work ultimately attains a ring of truth for the reader who sees
it in the context of his own life experience. According to Jauss in his
Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, the concept around which this
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process revolves is that of the 'horizon of expectations' .19 In reading
a literary work, the horizon of possible meanings projected by the
text is confronted with the set of expectations of the reader, with the
result that there occurs a 'fusion of horizons'20 within which the
process of understanding develops. It is the notion of 'fusion of
horizons' which provides the essential structure of literary
understanding. Jauss then extends this concept, using it to establish a
basis for the historical understanding of texts, where meanings
elaborated in the present are connected with meanings which come to
us from a recent or a distant past. Through the concept of 'fusion of
horizons', Jauss explains the process of reading as a form of dialogical
understanding between past and present, present and past being the
temporal equivalents of the instances of the Self and the Other. In this
coupling of inter-subjectivity and historicity, the crucial moment of
hermeneutic understanding remains always, as Jauss stresses, 'the
methodical reconciliation of the horizons of the text and of the
interpreter' .21
Now in what way does Jauss's hermeneutics contribute to an
ethics of 'reading? It can be said that the process of the merging of
horizons is invested with a telos, in the sense that the understanding
gained in reading texts possesses a particular orientation, or end.
To appreciate this point, it is instructive to see how the foremost
Hermeneutic philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, attempts to
associate the hermeneutic method with key elements of Aristotelian
EthicS.22 In the same way, says Gadamer, that Aristotle's practical
philosophy aims at the concretization of knowledge in specific
situations, hermeneutics is directed towards the appropriation of signs
to meaning systems established in the context of the individual's life
experience. To this end, the three moments which traditionally
constitute the hermeneutic method, namely understanding,
interpretation and application, are to be seen as progressive, each
stage building on the previous one so that we move progressively
from the strange to the familiar, from the general to the particular,
from the passive to the active. The hermeneutic process culminates in
this way in application, this being the final stage of understanding
in which meaning is appropriated to real-life situations, by virtue of
the change that is brought about in one's horizon of expectations
with respect to that situation. The point Gadamer is making, is
that hermeneutics as a discipline is fundamentally ethical in an
Aristotelian sense. That is to say, the form of knowledge it implies
is one in which the knower himself is fully implicated, so that it
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appears to him essentially as a task to be performed. Hermeneutics
aims toward that practical form of knowledge in which, as Gadamer
puts it, 'the person acting must see the concrete situation in the light
of what is asked of him in general' .23
Following the general observations made by Gadamer, we can
turn again to Jauss's literary hermeneutics in order to sec how he
translates them into a literary methodology. The final hermeneutic
moment of application is realized, in Jauss's methodology, by a
reviewof the meanings which have been attributed to canonical texts
in the different historical periods which have followed their first
publication. Thus, of a poem by Baudelaire written in the nineteenth
century, Jauss selects a number of commentaries which appeared
from the time of its first publication to the present day, with the
intention of, as he puts it, introducing a 'temporal dimension' into his
analysis of the poem. In Jauss's method, past and present horizons
of understanding are clearly distinguished, so as to show ' ... how
the meaning of the poem has unfolded itself historically in the
interaction between effect and reception-up to those very questions
that guide our interpretation and to which the text in its own time did
not have to be the answer' .24 Now, the specifically ethical character
of this process lies in the confrontation which occurs between past
and present interpretations, between one's own and previous readers'
interpretations of the text, the confrontation being a means, says
Jauss, 'to measure and to broaden the horizon of one's own experience
vis-a-vis the experience of the other' .25 We have no better method,
Jauss seems to say, to apprehend a text's relevance for present
day readers. The key term here is relevance, to be understood as the
end which informs all interpretation.
Conclusion
To conclude, I return to my original proposition that an ethics of
reading is characterized by the fact that it directly confronts the
question of purposiveness in literary studies. If ethics as a discipline
posits as the first principle of all activity the existence of an end, it
follows that any attempt to develop an ethics of reading must
incorporate the concept of purposiveness into its approach to literary
understanding. The three models I have chosen to discuss here strike
me as being particularly suggestive of such an enterprise. The fact
that they achieve this from very different vantage points, enhances
the claims made in favour of an ethical approach to literary studies.
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For Sanre, this purpose finds its expression in the individual's
commitment to effective political action. For Jauss, it involves the
creation of an awareness of one's relationship with the Other, and for
Hillis Miller, when he is not occupied with the corporatist defence of
Deconstruction, it signifies the responsibility of literary scholars
towards their profession and towards their students.26 Taking the
three models together, one could say that their defining moment lies
precisely with an overarching preoccupation with the question 'Why
read?', to be understood not in the sense of the pursuit of one's
personal tastes or interests, but in the sense that reading itself is
nothing if not oriented toward a project engaging the reader in the
domain of praxis.27
By making the notion of purposiveness central to an ethics of
reading, we are in effect positing a fundamental and necessary
relationship between text and context. This relationship manifests
itself as a distinct directedness, or orientation, which starts out from
the text's discursive structures as they are perceived by the reader,
and ends with the making of an existential choice as the final moment
of interpretation. Context is here defined as the universal destination
given to the process of reading as it is informed by reading's inherent
purposiveness. It is thus not to be equated with the empirical
conditions in which reading takes place. By saying that reading is
purposive, we are saying that literary understanding is possible in all
historical contexts. Seventeenth-century texts can be understood by
twentieth century readers, European texts by non-European readers,
and even ancient Asian texts can provide an enriching reading
experience to people who have no knowledge of the cultures from
which they originate. In all these cases,the rule of relevance is
universally admitted, insofar as it is conceived as a universal potential
for practical meanings to be extracted from texts, and insofar as texts
retain their value as an instance of reappraisal of the self seen in the
context of its life-situation. Such are the principles which would
seem to underlie the very idea of an ethics of reading.
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